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1 Introduction
With aging populations and soaring medical costs, health care has never been of greater concern to
policy-makers and individuals. The elderly in the United States in particular face large, volatile out-
of-pocket health expenses that increase quickly with age as Medicare only provides limited coverage
of some health care costs. In 2000, average out-of-pocket (OOP) expenditure for households with
heads aged 65 and over was approximately $3,000 with a standard deviation of over $6,000.1
Furthermore, individuals aged 85 years and over spent more than twice as much on medical care
as those aged 65 to 74. With high costs and limited insurance options, nursing home expenses are
a signiﬁcant driver of large and highly skewed OOP expenditures. Rates for nursing home care in
2005 were in the range of $60,000 to $75,000 per year and a signiﬁcant fraction of the elderly can
face nursing home costs that persist for years. Of the eighteen percent of 65-year-olds who will
require nursing home care at some point in their lifetime, nearly half will require more than 3 years
of care, and nearly a quarter will require more than 5 years.2
The two main ways in which the elderly ﬁnance medical and nursing home expenses not covered
by Medicare and insure against the risk of large OOP expenses are through private savings and
social insurance programs. A number of studies have emphasized the importance of OOP health
expenses and their risks for understanding individual saving behavior.3 The objective of this
paper is to quantitatively assess the impact of medical and nursing home expenses and their social
insurance for savings and inequality. In particular, we ask how the lack of complete public coverage
of both medical and nursing home expenses in the U.S. impacts aggregate and distributional saving
behavior and consumption inequality. We then assess the extent to which our ﬁndings depend
on the degree of insurance provided through other social insurance programs by examining the
interaction of public health care with public welfare for workers, Medicaid and old-age welfare, and
1Authors calculation based on data from the 2000 Health and Retirement Study.
2Source for nursing home costs: Metlife Market Survey of Nursing Home and Assisted Living Costs. Source for
nursing home usage statistics: Dick, Garber and MaCurdy (1994)
3Such as Kotlikoﬀ (1988), Hubbard et al. (1995), Palumbo (1999), Scholz et al. (2006), and De Nardi et al.
(2006).
1social security.
To this end we build a general equilibrium, life-cycle model with overlapping generations of
individuals and population growth. Individuals work till age 65 and then retire. During the working
stage of their lives, individuals face earnings uncertainty. Retired individuals face uncertainty with
respect to their survival as well as medical and nursing home expenses. Diﬀerent histories of
earnings give rise to cross-sectional wealth inequality well before retirement. We assume that
individuals cannot borrow and that there are no markets to insure against labor market, medical,
nursing home, or survival risk. Partial insurance, however, is available through three programs run
by the government: a progressive pay-as-you-go social security program, a welfare program that
guarantees a minimum level of consumption to workers, and a Medicaid-like social safety net that
guarantees a minimum consumption level to retirees with impoverishing medical and nursing home
expenses. We allow the insured consumption ﬂoor to be speciﬁc to the type of the health shock
(medical or nursing home).
We calibrate the benchmark economy to a set of cross-sectional moments from the U.S. data.
To pin down the stochastic process for medical costs, we use data from the Health and Retirement
Study. Since in the data we only observe OOP health expenditures and not total expenditures
(before Medicaid subsidies), we cannot directly infer the medical cost process. Instead, we cali-
brate the process so that the distribution of OOP expenditures generated by the model matches
the one observed in the data. Furthermore, our calibration procedure allows us to infer the level of
consumption provided under public nursing home care. In particular, we ﬁnd that the consumption
ﬂoor guaranteed by Medicaid to a nursing home resident lies below the consumption ﬂoor guar-
anteed to a non-nursing home resident. In other words, Medicaid provides diﬀerential insurance
against medical versus nursing home expense risk. We interpret this diﬀerential as reﬂecting a lower
quality of life provided by public nursing home care relative to receiving public assistance while
living at home.
Our main results are as follows. First, we ﬁnd that while, surprisingly, the lack of public
health care has little eﬀect on either aggregate wealth or consumption inequality, it implies that
12 percent of aggregate capital is accumulated to ﬁnance and self-insure against old-age health
expenses. Moreover even though OOP nursing home expenses are only one ﬁfth of total OOP
expenses, they account for half of the additional savings accumulated due to the absence of public
2coverage. This is because nursing home expenses are one of the largest shocks in the model economy,
the most persistent, and the least insured by the government and thus they are riskier than medical
expenses and generate a relatively higher level of precautionary savings. Furthermore, nursing home
expenses play a much larger role in the savings of the rich relative to the poor. The decline in asset
holdings of the top two permanent earnings quintiles accounts for three quarters of the aggregate
reduction in savings when public health care is introduced, and this decline is driven by the public
coverage of OOP nursing home expenses. Moreover, we ﬁnd that general equilibrium is important
as partial equilibrium analysis overstates the change in the capital stock due to public health care
by almost 60 percent.
Second, we ﬁnd that the impact of public health care on savings and inequality is highly sensitive
to features of other social insurance programs such as safety nets for the young and old, and pay-
as-you-go social security. In particular, we ﬁnd that providing low quality and/or means-tested
nursing home care generates substantial savings by wealthier individuals and promotes wealth and
consumption inequality among the elderly. Moreover, the relationships between the extent of social
insurance and savings and inequality are complex and highly dependent on the eligibility criteria
(universal or means-tested) to receive social assistance from a particular government program.
Given that there is a substantial amount of variation across countries with respect to the type and
extent of social insurance provided, these results suggest that our framework may be useful for
studying cross-country diﬀerences in savings and wealth inequality.
Third, we ﬁnd that between the two means-tested government assistance programs – welfare for
workers and Medicaid/welfare for retirees – Medicaid and old-age welfare have a much larger impact
on aggregate wealth accumulation. This is explained by the presence of OOP health expenses and
the timing of earnings versus health expense shocks. Essentially, savings for old-age health expenses
provide a signiﬁcant buﬀer against additional earnings risk introduced by the removal of its social
insurance.
Fourth, we ﬁnd that while precautionary savings for health expense risk plays a relatively minor
role, accounting for approximately 4 percent of aggregate capital, precautionary savings against
uncertainty about survival risk coupled with an upward-sloping mean health expenditure proﬁle
is substantial, accounting for 15 percent of aggregate capital. That is, precautionary savings are
driven by lifetime OOP health expense risk, rather than by the uncertainty about health expenses
3at any given age.
Our study is the ﬁrst to assess the impact of limited public coverage of both medical and
nursing home expenses on savings and inequality in a full life-cycle, general equilibrium framework.
It extends a large literature on life-cycle savings and wealth inequality (see Castaneda et al. for an
excellent survey). While most of this literature focuses on idiosyncratic income risk, our analysis
incorporates medical and nursing home expense risk. Works most closely related to our analysis
are by Ameriks et al. (2007), Hubbard et al. (1995), Scholz et al. (2006), and De Nardi et al.
(2006). Long-term care costs are explicitly modeled in Ameriks et al. (2007) with an objective
to disentangle the precautionary savings motive from the bequest motive using a strategic survey.
Safety nets are examined in a partial equilibrium framework in Hubbard et al. (1995) and De
Nardi et al. (2006). Our objective is diﬀerent from these studies in that we examine the impact for
aggregate savings and wealth inequality of the lack of public health care for medical and nursing
home expenses and the interaction of public health care with other social insurance programs.
Give that this is one of the ﬁrst attempts to explicitly model nursing home costs in a general
equilibrium, life-cycle, heterogeneous-agent model, for the sake of a transparent analysis, we chose
to abstract from a number of features, leaving them for future research. We now discuss a few of
these features in more detail. First, we do not model the Medicare program since it is not necessary
in order to achieve our objective. We do not model the demand for health care, but treat health
expenses as exogenous shocks. In such an environment the presence of an entitlement program
such as Medicare has no eﬀect on individual behavior apart from the tax distortions induced by
its public ﬁnance.4 Furthermore, Medicare expenses are not observed in our health expense data
source, the Health and Retirement Study, which is the primary data source for health expenses of
the elderly.
Second economic agents in our model are a combination of a household and an individual (in
the model, we refer to them as individuals). This is a compromise between model simplicity and
data availability that we are not the ﬁrst to make (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) is the
closest example to us). The main tradeoﬀ is that, on the one hand, the distributions of earnings
4Explicitly modeling Medicare would be necessary to analyze the impact of removing the program, reducing its
coverage, or changing its public ﬁnance. However, this type of analysis is not the goal of the current paper. See
Attanasio et al. (2008) for an example of such an analysis in a general equilibrium model which does not have explicit
nursing home risk.
4and wealth – two crucial dimensions of heterogeneity for the questions we address – are a result of
joint decision-making within the household, and as such, they make more sense at the household
level (even apart from the fact that the wealth distribution is only observed at the household level).
Whereas, on the other hand, nursing home entry and survival risk is individual and data on nursing
home residents is observed for individuals. Thus we view our agents as households when working
and as individuals when retired. This assumption is consistent with the fact that while the majority
of households with heads aged 25 to 64 consist of married couples, over 60 percent of households
with heads 65 and over are single individuals.5 Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the extent of earnings
risk in the model, which is the only part we calibrate using household level data, is of secondary
importance for savings and inequality to the presence of OOP medical and nursing home expenses,
their risks, and survival risk.
The paper proceeds as follows. The size and extent of social insurance for health expenses in
the U.S. are documented in Section 2. In Section 3, the benchmark model is presented. Section 4
explains the calibration of the benchmark economy. In Section 5 we compare the wealth distribution
generated by the model, and not targeted by the calibration procedure, to the one for the U.S. from
the data. We ﬁnd that the model does an excellent job at generating a wealth distribution that
is in line with the data, and that the large degree of wealth inequality generated by the model is
primarily due to the presence of means-tested social insurance. In Section 6, we assess the impact of
the lack of public health care for medical and nursing home expenses on savings and inequality and
then examine the interaction of other social insurance programs with the eﬀects of public health
care. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Evidence on Health Expenses and Public Insurance
In this section we ﬁrst discuss the size, composition and public insurance coverage of health expen-
ditures on aggregate, and then document the distribution of these expenditures across the elderly.
Among personal health expenditures, deﬁned as national health expenditures net of expenditures
on medical construction and medical research, we distinguish between medical and nursing home
expenditures. Medical expenditures include expenditures on hospital, physician and clinical ser-
5Explicitly modeling marriage and nursing home expense risk is signiﬁcantly more complicated for a number of
reasons that are mentioned in more detail in Section 7.
5Table 1: Personal Health Expenditures, 2002
by age total per capita
% % of GDP % of p.c. income
All ages 100 13 13
Under 65 65 8.6 13∗
65+ 35 4.4 36
65-74 13 1.6 26
75-84 14 1.7 40
85+ 8 1 66
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
∗ 19-64 year old
vices, prescription drugs, dental care, other professional and personal health care, home health care,
nondurables and durables. Nursing home expenditures include expenditures on skilled nursing fa-
cilities (facilities for individuals who require daily nursing care and living assistance) but not the
costs of services provided by retirement homes or assisted-living facilities.6 We take a look at two
public health insurance programs: Medicare and Medicaid. While Medicare is a federal entitlement
program for the elderly and disabled, Medicaid is a means-tested, federal/state program for the
poor. We ﬁnd that medical expenditures are substantially diﬀerent from nursing home expenditures
in both risk and public insurance coverage.
2.1 Personal Health Expenditures
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, personal health expenditures
accounted for 13 percent of GDP in 2002. Thirty-ﬁve percent of these, or 4.4 percent of GDP,
were expenditures on the elderly (individuals 65 years of age and over). In per capita terms,
however, personal health expenditures on the elderly outweigh expenditures for the rest of the
adult population. While the average expenditure on someone less than 65 years of age was close to
the national average of 13 percent of per capita income, the average expenditure on a 65 to 74 year
old was twice this amount, while for 75 to 84 year olds and individuals age 85 and up it was three
6Retirement home expenses are not included in our deﬁnition of medical expenses and are not eligible for Medicaid
coverage. The cost of assisted-living services within an assisted-living facility are counted as medical expenses however
room and board in such facilities is not. Furthermore, Medicaid does not cover room and board expenses in assisted-
living facilities and the criteria for eligibility of assisted-living services diﬀers from that for nursing home care. See
Mollica (2009) for details.
6Table 2: Personal Health Expenditures by How Financed for Individuals Ages 65 and Over, 2002










Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
times and ﬁve times this amount, respectively. Personal health expenditures by age as a percent of
GDP and per capita income are provided in Table 1.
How were the large expenditures on the elderly ﬁnanced? Table 2 shows that 34 percent of total
personal health expenditures, or 1.5 percent of GDP, were privately ﬁnanced either out-of-pocket,
with private insurance or through other means, while the remaining 66 percent, or 2.9 percent
of GDP, were publicly ﬁnanced by either Medicare, Medicaid, or other public programs. Note
that Medicaid ﬁnances a substantial portion – 14 percent – of the elderly’s medical expenses, or 0.6
percent of GDP. Table 3 shows that medical expenditures of the elderly not covered by Medicare are
primarily funded by private sources: either OOP directly or indirectly through insurance payments.
Private payments of the elderly accounted for 12.3 percent of per capita GDP while Medicaid
accounted for 5.2 percent. In addition, both private and Medicaid payments for medical care as a
share of income per capita increase with age. Note that Medicaid’s share of total expenditures net
of Medicare increases with age as well: it is 22 percent for 65 to 74 year-olds, 29 percent for 75
to 84 year-olds, and 41 percent for individuals ages 85 and up. Older individuals are more likely
to have large medical expenditures and to be impoverished by large OOP medical expenditures at
earlier ages, making them eligible for Medicaid transfers.
2.2 Nursing Home Care
Nursing home costs are one of the largest OOP health expenses faced by the elderly. According to
the Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey, in 2002 nursing home care accounted for 19 percent of
7personal health expenditures for individuals ages 65 and over and 0.85 percent of GDP. However,
since only 4 percent of the elderly resided in nursing homes (Federal Agency Forum of Aging-
Related Statistics), the cost per nursing home resident was substantially higher – 190 percent of
income per capita. Consistent with these statistics, the Metlife Market Survey of Nursing Home
and Assisted Living Costs reports that the average daily rate for a private room in a nursing home
in 2005 was $203 or $74,095 annually while the average daily rate for a semiprivate room was $176
or $64,240 annually.
Nursing home expenses in the U.S. are predominantly ﬁnanced either OOP or publicly by
either the Medicare or Medicaid programs. However, Medicare coverage for nursing home care
is limited in that it only covers costs for the ﬁrst six months of care and partially subsidizes the
next six months. Thus while Medicare is the primary payer of nursing home costs for residents
with short-term stays (stays of less than one year) its contribution to costs after the ﬁrst year is
extremely small. In addition private insurance markets for long-term care are scarce. While this is
in part due to supply-side problems that result in high costs and unreliable coverage, Brown and
Finkelstein (2008) ﬁnd that the lack of private long-term care insurance markets is largely due to
the public insurance system (Medicare and Medicaid) crowding out private insurance. This occurs
despite the fact that the public insurance system is far from satisfactory since it provides only a
limited reduction in risk exposure except for the poorest individuals. As a result, relative to other
health expenditures, only a small amount of nursing home care costs for individuals over 65 are
covered by Medicare or through private insurance. Table 4 provides a breakdown of nursing home
care expenses for individuals ages 65 and over by payment source. As shown in the table, the
elderly’s nursing home costs are primarily funded either out-of-pocket (37 percent) or by Medicaid
(37 percent). The table also shows the breakdown of nursing home residents of all ages by primary
payment type. Note that the majority, 58 percent, of nursing home residents at any given time are
Medicaid recipients while the smallest percentage are primarily ﬁnanced through Medicare.
Moreover, there are important diﬀerences in the Medicaid qualiﬁcations for medical expenses
versus nursing home expenses. In particular, non-nursing home recipients of Medicaid are allowed to
keep their homes, cars, income, and other assets guaranteeing them a certain level of consumption.
However, nursing home residents on Medicaid must contribute all their non-home, non-car assets
in excess of $2,000 and all of their monthly income, excluding a small (between $30 and $90)
8Table 3: Per Capita Private, Medicare and Medicaid Health Expenditures as a Percent of Income
Per Capita, 2002
Age Private Medicare Medicaid
65+ 12.3 17.5 5.2
65-74 9.7 12.6 2.7
75-84 12.7 20.9 5.2
85+ 21.6 27.2 15.1
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Table 4: Percent of Nursing Home Residents by Primary Payment Source for Individuals of All
Ages and Sources of Payment for Nursing Homes/Long-term care Institutions for Individuals Ages
65 and Over, 2002
Source of Payment % of NH residents ‡ % of total NH exp.‡‡ % of GDP ‡‡
Total NH exp. 100 100 0.85
Private 26 43 0.37
Out-of-pocket 37 0.31
Private Insurance 2 0.02
Other 4 0.04
Public 74 57 0.48
Medicare 15 18 0.15
Medicaid 58 37 0.31
Other 1 2 0.02
‡ Source: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and Uninsured, prepared by E. O’Brien and R. Elias, 2004
‡‡ Source: Medicare Current Beneﬁciary Survey, 2002.
“personal needs allowance” to their nursing home and medical expenses. Although they can keep
their home and car while conﬁned to a nursing home, these assets do not contribute much if any
to their level of consumption. In a nursing home facility, Medicaid covers room and board, nursing
care, therapy care, meals, and general medical supplies. However, Medicaid does not pay for a
single room, personal television and cable, phone and service, radios, batteries, clothes and shoes,
repairs of personal items, personal care services, among other goods and services. The result is
that the quality of life delivered to Medicaid-funded nursing home residents falls well below that of
privately-ﬁnanced nursing home residents. This view is supported by survey evidence documented
by Ameriks et al. (2007) who ﬁnd that wealthy people tend to avoid public long-term care due to
its low quality of life. This avoidance is termed “Medicaid aversion.”
Most estimates suggest that at age 65 the probability of ever entering a nursing home before
9death is somewhere between 0.3 and 0.4 and the average duration of stay is approximately 2 years.
However, while the majority of entrants will spend less than 1 year in a nursing home, with very
little out-of-pocket expense risk thanks to Medicare, there is still a sizable risk of long-term stay
in a nursing home resulting in large OOP expenses. For example, Brown and Finkelstein (2008)
estimate, consistently with the ﬁndings of Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy (1994), that approximately
40 percent of entrants will spend more than 1 year in a nursing home, while approximately one
ﬁfth will spend more than 5 years.
In our theoretical analysis, we capture the diﬀerential public insurance for nursing home versus
medical expenses by allowing for a diﬀerential in the consumption ﬂoor guaranteed under impov-
erishing medical expenses versus nursing home expenses and by calibrating the diﬀerential to be
consistent with the data on Medicaid’s share of total nursing home expenses. We show that this dif-
ferential insurance for medical versus nursing home expenses plays an important role in the saving
behavior of the wealthy.
2.3 Distribution of Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures
To assess the cross-sectional inequality in health expenditures, we use the Health and Retirement
Survey, waves 2002, 2004 and 2006, covering medical and nursing home expense information for
the years 2000 through 2005. Our sample consists of individuals, both married and single, 65 years
of age and older. We include insurance premia in the out-of-pocket health expenditures. Table 5
presents a set of moments describing the distribution of OOP medical and nursing home expenses
for this sample.
We ﬁnd that the distribution of OOP health expenses across the elderly is highly unequal, with
a Gini coeﬃcient of 0.67 and a normalized standard deviation of 2.77. In addition, the expenses are
highly concentrated at the top of the distribution, with the top 10 percent of the elderly accounting
for more than half and the top 1 percent for more than a ﬁfth of total OOP expenses. Moreover,
OOP expenses increase with permanent earnings. Since data on lifetime earnings is not available
to us, we use social security (SS) income as a proxy. The top SS income quintile spends OOP about
twice as much as the bottom quintile. Such a pattern is expected in the presence of a means-tested
subsidy which provides more social insurance to the lower-income quintiles. Although some studies
ﬁnd that the rich spend more on health services not only due to lower subsidies, but also due to
10Table 5: OOP Health Expense Distribution: Selected Moments
OOP Health Expenses
Gini 0.67









Shares and Mean Expenses of SS Income Groups, % Shares Mean†
First Quintile 13.4 17
Second Quintile 16.7 21
Third Quintile 18.4 23
Fourth Quintile 23.0 29




Source: 2002, 2004, and 2006 Data from the Health and Retirement Study.
† percent of average annual lifetime earnings in 2000
consumption of a higher quantity/quality of health services (see, for example, De Nardi, French and
Jones (2006)), in this analysis we take an extreme but simple view that attributes the diﬀerences
in the OOP health expenses across income groups entirely to the means-testing of social insurance.
3 The Model
In light of the evidence presented in the previous section, we model nursing home care explicitly
to allow for diﬀerential treatment of medical and nursing home expenses by the social insurance
system. Our theoretical analysis focuses on OOP health expenditures and the Medicaid program.
3.1 Economic Environment
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. An individ-
ual lives to a maximum of J periods, works during the ﬁrst R periods of his life, and retires at age
11R + 1. While working, an individual faces uncertainty about his earnings, and starting from the
retirement age, he faces uncertainty about his survival, medical expenses, and nursing home needs.
The government runs a social insurance program that guarantees a minimum consumption level.
This consumption level diﬀers by the type of destitution: due to low earnings of workers, or due to
impoverishing medical or nursing home expenses of the retired. In addition, the government runs
a pay-as-you-go social security program. Markets are competitive.
Individual earnings evolve over the life-cycle according to a function Ω(j,z) that maps individual
age j and current earnings shock z into eﬃciency units of labor, supplied to the labor market at wage
rate w. The earnings shock z follows an age-invariant Markov process with transition probabilities
given by Λzz′. The eﬃciency units of the new-born workers is distributed according to a p.d.f. Γz.
Similarly, medical expenditures evolve stochastically according to a function M(j,h) that maps
individual age j and current expenditure shock h into out-of-pockets costs of health care. The
medical expenditure shock h follows an age-invariant Markov process with transition probabilities
Λhh′. The initial distribution of medical expenditure shocks is given by Γh and it is independent
of the individual state.
The need for nursing home care in the next period of life, at age j + 1, arises with probability
θ(j+1,h) at each age j > R+1 and with probability ¯ θR+1 at age R+1. The probability of entering
a nursing home next period is increasing in age. For agents beyond age R+1 the entry probability
is increasing in the previous period’s medical expense. For simplicity, we assume that nursing home
is an absorbing state. While in a nursing home, agents have constant medical expenditure Mn,
which corresponds to the health shock value hn.
There are no insurance markets to hedge either earnings, medical expenditure, nursing home, or
mortality risks. Self-insurance is achieved with precautionary savings (labor supply is exogenous).
Individuals cannot borrow. Unintended bequests are taxed away by the government and are used
to ﬁnance government expenditure and social insurance transfers.7
7We do this to avoid the unrealistic impact that redistributing bequests as lump-sum transfers would have on
agents eligibility for means-tested transfers. In addition, we wish to avoid the unrealistic impact that an arbitrary
redistribution of bequests would have on individuals’ saving behavior in response to changes in the social insurance
system.
123.2 Demographics
Agents face survival probabilities that are conditional on both age and nursing home status. The
probability that an age-(j   1) individual survives to age j is sj if he is not residing in a nursing
home, and sn
j < sj if he is in a nursing home. Since a working-age agent faces neither mortality nor
nursing home risk, his survival probability is sj = 1, j = 1,2,...,R. Let ¯ θj denote the unconditional
(independent of the previous period’s medical expense) probability of entering a nursing home at
age j. Then, without conditioning on his current medical expense shock, an age-(j   1), retired
individual enters a nursing home in period j with probability ¯ θj > 0. Let λj denote the fraction
of cohort j residing in a nursing home. This fraction is zero for working-age cohorts. For a newly
retired cohort, the fraction is just the unconditional probability of entering a nursing home, so
λR+1 = ¯ θR+1. Finally, for a retired cohort of age R + 1 < j  J, the fraction λj evolves according
to
λj =




where the denominator, ¯ sj = sj(1 λj−1)+sn
j λj−1, is the average survival rate from age j  1 to j
and the numerator is a weighted sum of the survival rate of new entrants and the survival rate of
current residents.





, for j = 2,3,...,J.
3.3 Workers' Savings
The state of a working individual consists of his age j, assets a, average lifetime earnings to date ¯ e,
and current productivity shock z. The individual’s taxable income y consists of his interest income
ra and labor earnings e net of the payroll tax τe(e). The individual allocates his assets, taxable
income less income taxes τy(y), and transfers from the government T (j,y,a) between consumption
c and savings a′ by solving









c + a′ = a + y   τy(y) + T(y,a), (2)
y = e   τe(e) + ra, (3)
e = wΩ(j,z), (4)





a + y   τy(y)
]}
. (6)
where cw is a minimum consumption level guarranteed to workers.
3.4 Old-age Health Care
Retired individuals face uncertainty about their medical and nursing home needs. The nursing
home state is entered once and for all, but every period individuals can choose between private
and public nursing home care.8 An individual’s nursing home status is denoted by the variable l,
which takes a value of either 0, indicating that the individual is currently not in a nursing home,
1, indicating that he is currently in a nursing home under private care, or 2, indicating that he is
currently in a nursing home under public care.
3.4.1 Medical care
Conditional on surviving to the next period, a working individual of age R with state (a, ¯ e,z) will
enter a nursing home upon retirement with probability ¯ θR+1. His future state contains a health
shock, h′, that determines his medical care costs. The problem of this individual is
V (R,a, ¯ e,z) = maxc;a′≥0
{
U(c) + βsR+1(1   ¯ θR+1)E
[





V (R + 1,a′, ¯ e,hn,1),V (R + 1,a′, ¯ e,hn,2)
]}
(8)
subject to the constraints above.
Resources of a retired individual of age j > R come from the return on his savings (1+r)a, his
8The assumption that the nursing home state is absorbing is not unreasonable given that we set the model period
to two years, Dick et al. (1994) ﬁnd that the majority of long-term nursing home spells end in death and Murtaugh
et al. (1997) ﬁnd that the majority of nursing home users die within one year of discharge.
14social security beneﬁt S(¯ e), and government transfers T (j,a, ¯ e,h). After paying health care costs
M(j,h) and income taxes, the individual allocates his remaining resources between consumption
and savings. Conditional on survival, the agent will entering a nursing home next period with
probability θ(j + 1,h). We assume that the health shock does not directly aﬀect agents’ utility.
An age-j individual with assets a, average life-time earnings ¯ e, health shock h, and who is not in a
nursing home solves













V (j + 1,a′, ¯ e,hn,1),V (j + 1,a′, ¯ e,hn,2)
]} (9)
subject to




+ T (j,a,h), (10)
y = S(¯ e) + ra, (11)
˜ y = max
{
0,ra   max[0,M(j,h)   κra]
}
, (12)
T (j,a,h) = max
{
0,cm + M(j,h)   [a + y   τy(˜ y)]
}
(13)
where cm is the minimum consumption level guaranteed under impoverishing medical expenses.
Agents receive a medical expense income tax deduction. In other words, individuals pay taxes on
their interest income minus the fraction of their medical expenses that exceed κ percentage of their
taxable income.
3.4.2 Nursing home care
Once nursing home needs arise, an individual has to choose between private and public nursing home
care. We assume that private care diﬀers from public only in the consumption value it provides
(nicer rooms but the same medical care). Public nursing home care provides a uniform level of
consumption, denoted by cn. By letting cn diﬀer from cm, we allow for diﬀerential insurance
provided for medical and nursing home expenses. Hence the government’s per resident cost of
15nursing home care is Mn + cn. To qualify for public nursing home care, an individual must meet
the following eligibility criteria: his income net of taxes plus the value of assets have to fall below a
threshold level. Note that individuals will only choose public care if their consumption level under
private care falls below cn. In addition, since the agents’ income streams during retirement are
deterministic and constant, an agent receiving public care would never choose to switch to private
care in the future. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that when an individual enters public care he
surrenders all of his assets as well as current and future pension income to the government and has
no further decisions to make.
An individual in private nursing home care decides how much to save and whether to switch to
public nursing care by solving














0,ra   max[0,Mn   κra]
})
, (15)
y = S(¯ e) + ra, (16)
where the value of entering a public nursing home is










  ¯ V n
j+1.
Note that there are no government transfers to individuals receiving private nursing home care.
However, such individuals are still eligible for a medical expense tax deduction.
3.5 Goods Production
Firms produce goods by combining capital K and labor L according to a constant-returns-to-scale
production technology: F(K,L). Capital depreciates at rate δ and can be accumulated through
investments of goods: I = K′   (1   δ)K. Firms maximize proﬁts by renting capital and labor
from households. Perfectly competitive markets ensure that factors of production are paid their
16marginal products. Goods can be consumed by individuals, used in health care, and invested in
physical capital.
3.6 General Equilibrium
We consider a steady-state competitive equilibrium in this economy. For the purposes of deﬁning





xW  (a, ¯ e,z), if 1  j  R,
xR  (a, ¯ e,h,l), if R < j  J.
Accordingly, we redeﬁne value functions, decision rules, taxable income and transfers to be functions
of the individual state (j,x). Let the state spaces be given by XW  [0,1)  [0,1)  ( 1,1)
and XR  [0,1)  [0,1)  ( 1,1)  f0,1,2g, and denote by Ξ(X) the Borel σ-algebra on
X 2 fXW,XRg. Let Ψj(X) be a probability measure of individuals with state x 2 X in cohort j.
Note that these agents constitute ηjΨj(X) fraction of the total population.
DEFINITION. Given a ﬁscal policy fS(¯ e),G,cw,cm,cn,κg, a steady-state equilibrium is fc(j,x),a′(j,x),l(j,xR),V (j,x)g,
fΨjgJ
j=1, fw,r,K,Lg and fτs(e),τy(y)g such that
1. Given prices, the decision rules c(j,x), a′(j,x) and l(j,xR) solve the dynamic programming
problems of the households.




















X Ω(j,z)dΨj = L.













17for all X0 2 Ξ, where I is an indicator function and Qj(x,x′) is the probability that an agent
of age j and current state x transits to state x′ in the following period. (A formal deﬁnition
of Qj(x,x′) is provided in the Appendix.)


























fI[l(j   1,x) = 0](1   sj)


























I[l(j   1,x) < 2,l(j,x′) = 2]a′(j   1,x)Q(x,x′)dΨj−1dΨj.
4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match a set of aggregate and distributional moments for the U.S.
economy, including demographics, earnings, medical and nursing home expenses, as well as features
of the U.S. social welfare, Medicaid, social security and income tax systems. Some of the parameter
values can be determined ex-ante, others are calibrated by making the moments generated by a
stationary equilibrium of the model target corresponding moments in the data. The calibration
procedure minimizes the diﬀerence between the targets from the data and model-predicted values.
Our calibration strategy for stochastic processes for earnings and medical expenses is similar to
Castaneda et al. (2003) in that we do not restrict the processes to, for example, AR(1), but instead
18target a wide set of moments characterizing the earnings and OOP health expense distributions.
Unlike Castaneda et al., we do not target the distribution of wealth because part of our objective
is to learn how much wealth inequality can be generated by idiosyncratic risk in earnings, health
expenses, and survival in a pure life-cycle model. We do not restrict the stochastic processes for
earnings and medical expenses to AR(1) processes for the following reasons. First, as Castaneda et
al. (2003) demonstrate, models which use AR(1) processes for earnings have diﬃculty generating
the degree of earnings inequality observed in the data and, second, French and Jones (2004) ﬁnd
that the the stochastic process for medical expenses is not well approximated by an AR(1) process.
Thus we choose the parameters of the discrete Markov chains for earnings and medical expenses to
match directly the earnings and medical expense distributions in the data.
We start by presenting functional forms and setting parameters whose direct estimates are
available in the data. Although the calibration procedure identiﬁes the rest of the parameters by
solving a simultaneous set of equations, for expositional purposes, we divide the parameters to be
calibrated into groups and discuss associated targets and their measurement in the data. Most of
the data statistics used in the calibration procedure are averages over or around 2000-2006, which
is the time period covered by the HRS. More fundamental model parameters rely on long-run data
averages.
4.1 Age structure
In the model, agents are born at age 21 and can live to a maximum age of 100. We set the model
period to two years because the data on OOP health expenses is available bi-annually. Thus the
maximum life span is J = 40 periods. For the ﬁrst 44 years of life, i.e. the ﬁrst 22 periods, the
agents work, and at the beginning of period R + 1 = 23, they retire.
Population growth rate n targets the ratio of population 65 year old and over to that 21 years old
and over. According to U.S. Census Bureau, this ratio was 0.18 in 2000. We target this ratio rather
than directly set the population growth rate because the weight of the retired in the population
determines the tax burden on workers, which is of a primary importance to our analysis of the
eﬀects of the social insurance system.
194.2 Preferences





so that 1/γ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Based on estimates in the literature, we
set γ equal to 2.0. The subjective discount factor, β is determined in the calibration procedure
such that the rate of return on capital in the model is consistent with an annual rate of return of
4 percent.
4.3 Technology
Consumption goods are produced according to a production function,
F(K,L) = AKL1−,
where capital depreciates at rate δ. The parameters α and δ are set using their direct counterparts
in the U.S data: a capital income share of 0.3 and an annual depreciation rate of 7 percent (Gomme
and Rupert (2007)). The parameter A is set such that the wage per an eﬃciency unit of labor is
normalized to one under the benchmark calibration .
4.4 Earnings Process
In the model, worker’s productivity depends on his age and an idiosyncratic productivity shock
according to a function Ω(j,z). We assume that this function consists of a deterministic age-






β1(j + i) + β2(j + i)2]
+ z,
where z follows a ﬁnite-valued Markov process with probability transition matrix Λzz′. Initial
productivity levels are drawn from the distribution Γz.
The coeﬃcients on age and age-squared are set to 0.109 and -0.001, respectively, obtained from
201968 to 1996 PSID data on household heads.9 We assume that there are 5 possible values for z and
that the probabilities of going from the two lowest productivity levels to the highest one and from
the two highest ones to the lowest one are 0. These restrictions, combined with a normalization
and imposing the condition that the rows of Λzz′ and elements of Γz must sum to one, leaves 24
parameters to be determined. These parameters are chosen by targeting the following statistics:
the variance of log earnings of households with heads age 55 relative to those with heads age 35, the
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of earnings, the Gini coeﬃcient for earnings, 8 points on the Lorenz curve
for earnings, corresponding to the ﬁve quintiles and top 1, 5, and 10 percent of the distribution,
mean Social Security income levels by Social Security income quintile, and 8 points in the Lorenz
curve for Social Security income. Thus we target a relative variance for 55 year-olds of 1.89 and
a ﬁrst-order autocorrelation for z of 0.97 (converted from an annual autocorrelation of 0.98) using
estimates taken from Storesletten et al. (2004). The data points for the earnings Lorenz curve are
taken from Rodriguez at el. (2002). The targets on the Lorenz curve for Social Security income and
mean Social Security by quintile are taken from waves 2002 through 2006 of the HRS. We target
mean Social Security income by quintiles since we also target mean OOP medical expenditures by
Social Security income quintiles, as discussed below. We use social security income quintiles as a
proxy for lifetime earnings quintiles because lifetime earnings is not available to us.
4.5 Medical Expense Process
Retired agents not residing in a nursing home face medical expenses that are a function of their
current age and medical expense shock. Similarly to the earnings process, we assume that medical
expenses can be decomposed into a deterministic age component and a stochastic component:
lnM(j,h) = βm;1j + βm;2j2 + h,
where h follows a ﬁnite state Markov chain with probability transition matrix Λhh′ and newly
retired agents draw their medical expense shock h from an initial distribution denoted by Γh.
We assume that for each age there are 4 possible medical expense levels, which we ﬁx exoge-
9The sample is restricted to the heads of household, between the age of 18 and 65, not self-employed, not working
for the government, working at least 520 hours during the year; excluding observations with the average hourly wage
(computed as annual earnings over annual hours worked) less than half the minimum wage in that year; weighted
using the PSID sample weights. We thank Gueorgui Kambourov for providing us with the regression results.
21nously. Thus specifying the process for h requires choosing 20 parameters: 16 parameters specifying
the probability transition matrix for h, Ωhh′, and 4 parameters characterizing the initial distribution
of medical expenditure shocks, Γh. Since the rows of the transition matrix and the initial distribu-
tion must sum to one, the degrees of freedom to be determined reduces to 15. Thus, including the
coeﬃcients in the deterministic component, 17 parameters still remain to be chosen to specify the
medical expense process.
To calibrate the 17 parameters governing the OOP health expense process, we use 20 aggregate
and distributional moments for OOP health expenses: the Gini coeﬃcient and 8 points in the
Lorenz curve of the OOP medical expense distribution, shares of OOP health expenses and Medicaid
expenses in GDP for each age group – 65 to 74 year-olds, 75 to 84 year-olds, and those 85 and above
– and the shares of the OOP health expenses that are paid by each social security income quintile.
The targets and their values in the data are summarized in the next section. The distributional
moments were documented in section 2 using the HRS data. OOP and Medicaid expenses by age
groups are 2001-2006 averages based on the aggregate data from the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services. Note that our measure of OOP health expenditures corresponds to the sum
of all private health care expenditures, including the costs of health insurance.
4.6 Nursing Home Expense Risk
The nursing home expense risk in the model is intended to capture the risk expenses due to a
long-term (more than one year) stay in a nursing home. Starting at age R, agents face age-speciﬁc
probabilities of entering a nursing home for a long-term stay in the following period and starting
at age R + 1, entry probabilities depend on both age and health. The unconditional probabilities
of entering a nursing home at each age j + 1 are f¯ θjgJ
j=R+1 and the probabilities conditional on
health are fθ(j +1,h)gJ
j=R+1. We assume that, at each age j, the probability of entering a nursing
home next period increases in M(j,h) at a constant rate or




n;2 lnM(j,h), j = R + 1,...,J.
For simplicity we assume that the rate at which the entry probability increases with health is
constant across ages, i.e., β
j
n;2 = βn;2 for all j > R. In addition, we assume that the unconditional
22probability of entering a nursing home is the same across agents within the following age groups:




chosen such that the unconditional nursing home entry probabilities satisfy
¯ θj =

    
    
¯ θ65−74, for 1  R + j < 6,
¯ θ75−84, for 6  R + j < 11,
¯ θ85+, for 11  R + j  J,
and the 3 probabilities, ¯ θ65−74, ¯ θ75−84, and ¯ θ85+, target the percentage of individuals residing in
a nursing home for at least one year in each age group. According to the U.S. Census special
tabulation for 2000, these percentage were 1.1, 4.7, and 18.2, respectively. The growth rate βn;2 is
chosen along with the parameters of the medical expense process by targeting Medicaid’s share of
medical expenses by age.
The medical cost of 2 years of nursing home care in the model economy, Mn targets the share
of total nursing home expenses net of those paid by Medicare in GDP. Since Medicare pays for
most of the nursing home costs for individuals with short-term stays, this share captures well the
total expenditure on long-term residents. According to statistics drawn from the Medicare Current
Beneﬁciary Surveys from the period 2000 to 2003, the average cost of nursing home care net of
Medicare payments was 0.68 percent of GDP. Note that to be consistent with the data, in the model,
total nursing home expenses are computed as the sum of the medical costs and consumption in a
nursing home: Mn + cn.
4.7 Survival Probabilities
Recall that while agents of age j = R + 1,...,J not residing in a nursing home have probability
sj+1 of surviving to age j + 1 conditional on having survived to age j, retired agents residing in
nursing homes face diﬀerent survival probabilities, given by fsn
j gJ
j=R+2. These two sets of survival
probabilities are not set to match their counterparts in the data for two reasons: ﬁrst, there are
no estimates of survival probabilities by nursing home status available for the U.S., and second,
since we are targeting statistics on aggregate nursing home costs, it is important for the model to
be consistent with the data on nursing home usage. Therefore, the survival probabilities are set as
23follows. First, we assume that for each cohort, the probability of surviving to the next age while
in a nursing home is a constant fraction of the probability of surviving to the next age outside of
a nursing home:
sn
j = ϕnsj, for j = R + 2,...,J.
Then we pin-down the value of ϕn by targeting the fraction of individuals aged 65 and over residing
in nursing homes in the U.S. in 2000 subject to the restriction that the unconditional age-speciﬁc
survival probabilities are consistent with those observed in the data.10 According to U.S. Census
special tabulation for 2000, the fraction of the 65 plus population in a nursing home in 2000 was
4.5 percent.
4.8 Government
The government-run welfare program in the model economy guarantees agents a minimum consump-
tion level. The welfare program, which is available to all agents regardless of age, represents public
assistance programs in the U.S. such as food stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
Supplemental Social Security Income, and Medicaid. Since estimates of the government-guaranteed
consumption levels for working versus retired individuals are found to be very similar, we assume
that they are the same. However, the level of social insurance of destitution due to high health
expenses depends on the type of expenses – nursing home or medical. In the literature, estimates
of the consumption level for a family consisting of one adult and two children is approximately 35
percent of expected average annual lifetime earnings, while the minimum level for retired house-
holds has been estimated to be in the range of 15 to 20 percent (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
(1994) and Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006)).11 These estimates suggest that the mini-
mum consumption ﬂoor for individuals is somewhere in the range of 10 to 20 percent.12 We set the
10The data on survival probabilities is taken from Table 7 of Life Tables for the United States Social Security Area
1900-2100 Actuarial Study No. 116 and are weighted averages of the probabilities for both men and women born in
1950.
11Expected average annual lifetime earnings in 1999 is computed as a weighted average of estimates of average
lifetime earnings for diﬀerent education groups taken from The Big Payoﬀ: Educational Attainment and Synthetic
Estimates of Work-Life Earnings. U.S. Census Bureau Special Studies. July 2002. The weights are taken from
Educational Attainment: 2000 Census Brief. August 2003.
12However, this statement should be taken with caution. The consumption ﬂoor is diﬃcult to measure due to
the large variation and complexity in welfare programs and their coverage. In addition, families with two adults
and adults under 65 without children would receive substantially less in beneﬁts then found above. Consistent with
this, by estimating their model, DeNardi, French, and Jones (2006), ﬁnd a much lower minimum consumption level:
approximately 8 percent of expected average annual lifetime earnings. This is similar to a value of about 6 percent
24consumption ﬂoor for workers and retirees not in a nursing home, cw = cm, to 15 percent of the
average annual earnings.
Obtaining an estimate of a consumption ﬂoor provided to nursing home residents is problematic
because it requires estimating the value of the rooms and amenities that nursing homes provide to
Medicaid-funded residents. Instead, we calibrate the minimum consumption level for nursing home
residents, cn, to match Medicaid’s share of nursing home expenses for individuals 65 and over.
According to the Current Medicare Beneﬁciary Survey, over the period 2000 to 2003, on average,
Medicaid’s share of the elderly’s total nursing home expenses net of those paid by Medicare was
approximately 45 percent.
The social security beneﬁt function in the model captures the progressivity of the U.S. social
security system by making the marginal replacement rate decrease with average earnings. Following
Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2006), the marginal tax replacement rate is 90 percent for
earnings below 20 percent of the economy’s average earnings ¯ E, 33 percent for earnings above that
threshold but below 125 percent of ¯ E, and 15 percent for earnings beyond that up to 246 percent




       
       
s1¯ e, for ¯ e  τ1,
s1τ1 + s2(¯ e   τ1), for τ1  ¯ e  τ2,
s1τ1 + s2(τ2   τ1) + s3(¯ e   τ2), for τ2  ¯ e  τ3,
s1τ1 + s2(τ2   τ1) + s3(τ3   τ2), for ¯ e  τ3.
where the marginal replacement rates, s1, s2, and s3 are set to 0.90, 0.33, and 0.15, respectively.
While the threshold levels, τ1, τ2, and τ3, are set respectively to 20 percent, 125 percent and 246
percent of the economy’s average earnings.
The payroll tax which is used to fund the social security system is assumed to be proportional,
thus
τe(e) = ˆ τee,
where the tax rate ˆ τe is determined in equilibrium. Likewise, income taxes in the model economy
used by Palumbo (1999). However, health expenses in the model of DeNardi et al. include nursing home costs, and
hence their estimate is not directly comparable to the non-nursing home minimum consumption level in our model.
Thus we do not use their estimate.
25Table 6: Calibrated Parameters
parameter description values
β subjective discount factor 0.954∗
γ coeﬃcient of risk aversion 2.0
n population growth rate 0.021
consumption ﬂoors
cw workers 0.15†
cm retirees not in a nursing home 0.15†
cn nursing home residents 0.09†
Mn medical cost of nursing home care 0.86†
ϕn relative survival probability
for nursing home residents
0.919
probabilities of entering a nursing home in next 2 years
¯ θ65−74 65 to 74 year-olds 0.004
¯ θ75−84 75 to 84 year-olds 0.0136
¯ θ85+ 85 and up 0.0551
βn;2 growth rate of nursing home prob. with medical expenses 0.938
coeﬃcients in the deterministic component of medical expenses
βm;1 age 0.13
βm;2 age-squared  0.0058‡
A TFP in production 1.17
α capital’s share of output 0.3
δ capital’s deprecation rate 0.07
∗All numbers are annual unless otherwise noted.
†Fraction of expected average annual lifetime earnings.
‡The size and sign of this coeﬃcient does not mean that total health expenses decrease at later ages. This coeﬃcient
is for medical expenses only, in particular, is does not include nursing home expenses. Average health expenses
increase with age.
26are assumed to be proportional so that
τy(y) = ˆ τyy.
The tax rate ˆ τy is also determined in equilibrium. As is the case under the U.S. tax system, taxable
income is income net of health expenses that exceed 7.5 percent of income. Thus κ is set to 0.075.
Finally, government spending, G is set such that, in equilibrium, government spending as a fraction
of output is 19 percent.
4.9 Benchmark calibration
The model parametrization is summarized in Table 6. Information on the algorithm used to com-
pute the equilibrium along with the transition probability matrices and other parameters governing
the earnings and OOP health expense processes are included in the Appendix. The equilibrium
tax rates in the benchmark economy are 0.254 for income tax and 0.079 for payroll tax. Note that
our calibration produced a value for the nursing home consumption ﬂoor, cn, which lies below the
non-nursing home consumption ﬂoor, cm. We view this diﬀerential as reﬂecting a lower quality of
life enjoyed in a public nursing home facility relative to receiving public assistance while living at
home. As we show later in our quantitative analysis, the low quality of life under public nursing
care plays an important role in individual saving decisions.
The exogeneity of the earnings distribution allows us to match it with a much greater precision
then other sources of heterogeneity in the model economy. Since the contribution of our analysis
comes from modeling medical and nursing home expense risk, we conﬁne our discussion to the
latter, while reporting the ﬁt of the earnings distribution in the Appendix.
In the data, individual medical expenses are only observed net of public subsidies. Hence we
calibrate the stochastic process for total medical and nursing home expenses to match aggregate
levels of OOP health expenses and their observed distribution across the population. In particular,
we target the cross-sectional distribution of OOP expenses, shares of OOP and Medicaid expenses
in GDP by age group, and the distribution of OOP expenses by social security income. Moreover,
the nursing home expense process targets the distribution of nursing home residents and aggregate
nursing home costs by source of payment. The results of the calibration procedure are presented
27Table 7: Distribution of Medical and Nursing Home Expenses by Source of Payment
Targeted Moments Data Model Data Model
OOP Expenses
Gini 0.67 0.68
Shares of Total, %
First Quintile 0.13 0.10
Second Quintile 2.75 2.60
Third Quintile 9.76 9.32
Fourth Quintile 20.16 20.79
Fifth Quintile 67.21 67.19
Top 10% 50.71 50.47
Top 5% 38.84 40.57
Top 1% 21.77 14.45
Shares and Mean Expenses of SS Income Groups Shares, % Mean, % p.c. Income
First Quintile 13.4 2.7 17 1
Second Quintile 16.7 18.1 21 17
Third Quintile 18.4 23.3 23 22
Fourth Quintile 23.0 27.5 29 26
Fifth Quintile 28.5 28.3 36 26
Top 10% 7.5 14.2
Top 5% 6.5 7.2
Top 1% 1.4 1.4











Share of GDP, % 0.68 0.69
Share of Total Health Expenses, % 33 33
Medicaid Share of NH Costs, % 45 44





28Table 8: Medical and Nursing Home Expenses: Aggregate Summary
Health Expense Data Model
Medical
OOP, % of GDP 1.5 1.5
Medicaid, % of GDP 0.6 0.6
Nursing Home
OOP, % of GDP, % 0.38 0.39
Medicaid, % of GDP 0.31 0.30
Independent Moments
Fraction of NH residents on Medicaid 0.58∗ 0.60
Nursing Home Entry Probability 0.14† 0.15
∗ includes individuals under 65
† probability of entering and staying a year or more
in Table 7. Overall, the distribution of OOP health expenses in the benchmark economy closely
replicates a wide range of data moments. Table 8 summarizes the cross-sectional targets from Table
7 into aggregate statistics for the benchmark economy, showing a good model ﬁt with the data on
aggregate. Among the independent moments characterizing health expenses, the model successfully
predicts the fraction of nursing home residents receiving Medicaid subsidy and the probability of
entering a nursing home for a long-term stay.
5 The Benchmark Economy
In this section we ﬁrst assess the ability of the calibrated model to generate cross-sectional and
life-cycle wealth inequality as observed in the U.S. economy. We then examine the contribution
of precautionary savings to wealth accumulation and inequality. Building a life-cycle theory of
economic inequality is crucial for a quantitative analysis of the impact of health expenses and the
structure of old-age social insurance on savings and inequality for many reasons. To name a few,
ﬁrst, social safety nets target the low-income population. Second, the savings response to various
types of risks may diﬀer across the permanent earnings distribution. Finally, when wealth is highly
concentrated in the hands of a few, their saving behavior has large consequences for the whole
economy. In order to assess how individuals vary across the permanent earnings distribution, we
often compare individuals across permanent earnings quintiles. Table 9 shows the earnings of each







permanent earnings quintile relative to mean earnings in the benchmark economy.
5.1 Wealth Inequality
Before proceeding to the model predictions about wealth inequality under the benchmark calibra-
tion, it is useful to discuss the motives behind savings in the model economy and how they diﬀer
across the permanent earnings distribution. In the economy, agents receive earnings income when
young and pay for medical and nursing home expenses when old and retired. They face uncertainty
about their earnings, medical and nursing home expenses, and survival. Old-age health expenses
are either ﬁnanced OOP using private savings and social security income or, for eligible agents,
by the Medicaid program. The absence of private insurance markets coupled with borrowing con-
straints generates additional (precautionary) savings as agents desire to smooth consumption over
their lifetime. The presence of means-tested social insurance implies that richer individuals rely on
private savings to ﬁnance health care much more than poorer ones. The welfare program discour-
ages saving of low-income workers early on in life, and Medicaid further discourages their saving to
ﬁnance health expenses experienced later on. Consistent with this, Figure 1a shows that the major
beneﬁciaries of the Medicaid program in the model are in the bottom 20 percent of the permanent
earnings distribution.
Wealthier and poorer agents saving behavior particularly diﬀers when it comes to nursing home
expenses. As the most persistent and one of the largest health expense realizations in the model
economy, nursing home expenses require a higher level of savings than medical expenses. As a result,
low-income individuals, for whom in some cases nursing home care is altogether unaﬀordable, are
more likely to allow Medicaid to cover their nursing home care costs, saving instead for smaller OOP
medical expenses. Whereas, the saving behavior of wealthier individuals is driven by both medical
30and nursing home expenses. Self-insurance against the nursing home shock by wealthier individuals
is particularly important given the relatively low consumption ﬂoor provided to nursing home
residents, which makes the destitution due to nursing home expenses more painful relative to the
one due to medical expenses. Figure 1b shows that the main nursing home beneﬁciaries of Medicaid
are those in the bottom 40 percent of the permanent earnings distribution and older individuals
from higher quintiles. Note that the take-up rate of Medicaid is much higher among nursing
home residents. This is not surprising given the size and persistence of this shock. Nursing home
residents quickly deplete their assets and qualify for Medicaid sooner than the general population.
Furthermore, the probability of entering a nursing home next period is increasing in agents’ current
period medical expense shock. Hence nursing home residents are more likely than the rest of
the population to have been impoverished by high medical expenses and be eligible for Medicaid
transfers.
To sum up, the safety net structure of social insurance implies that individuals across the
permanent earnings distribution save for diﬀerent kinds of OOP health expenses and, as a result,
eﬀectively face diﬀerent kinds of OOP health expense risk. Figure 2a shows the distribution of
OOP health expenses by permanent earnings quintile and age. The ﬁrst quintile pays on average
ﬁve times smaller OOP health expenses than the second quintile. Furthermore, expected annual
OOP health expenses relative to annual income are the highest for individuals in the middle of the
permanent earnings distribution. Figure 2b shows that permanent earnings quintiles two, three,
and four expect the largest health expenses relative to their current incomes. These diﬀerence in
OOP expenses relative to current income will be key to understanding diﬀerences in saving behavior
across the permanent earnings distribution in response to the changes in the social insurance system
analyzed in Section 6.
In an empirical analysis, Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) document that the saving rates of
working age households increase with current and permanent income. We compute the saving rates
for each earnings quintile by age in the model economy as the ratio of the change in asset holdings
of a quintile to the current disposable income of that quintile. Figure 3a shows that the higher
permanent earnings quintiles save a higher fraction of their current disposable income. Agents in
the highest permanent earnings quintile have the highest average saving rate up until age 40.
The question we now ask is what eﬀects this variation in saving behavior has on the distribution
31of wealth in the economy. First, we compare the wealth inequality generated by the model to the
data. Recall that our calibration procedure did not target any wealth distribution moments. Table
10 reveals that cross-sectional wealth inequality in the benchmark economy has a remarkable ﬁt of
the U.S. wealth distribution, as documented in Rodriguez et al. (2002). The share of wealth held
by the top 1 percent of the population in the model economy, 28 percent, is remarkably high for
a pure overlapping-generations model. Moreover, the wealth Gini in the benchmark economy is
U-shaped over the life-cycle (Figure 3b), which is consistent with the pattern observed in the data
(Huggett, 1996).
To investigate the role that health expenses and social safety nets play in generating the high
concentration of wealth in the benchmark economy, we conduct the following partial equilibrium
analysis. We ﬁrst remove all health expenses from the economy. We ﬁnd that not only are health ex-
penses not responsible for the high wealth concentration, but they actually reduce wealth inequality
and concentration. We then almost completely remove the safety nets from the benchmark econ-
omy by setting the consumption ﬂoors for all government transfers to a very small number. The
wealth Gini coeﬃcient decreases by 23 percentage points and the share of wealth held by the top
1 percent falls by a half. Finally, we remove both health expenses and safety nets and compare it
to the economy without safety nets. Again, we ﬁnd that health expenses reduce wealth inequality
and concentration, while the presence of safety nets dampens their eﬀect. Thus, we conclude that
the high degree of inequality and concentration of wealth in the benchmark economy is driven by
the presence of safety nets. The ﬁndings are summarized in Table 10. In Section 6, we study these
eﬀects in more detail and provide an explanation for the puzzling eﬀect that health expenses have
on inequality.
5.2 Precautionary Savings Due to Old-Age Uncertainty
To further understand the drivers of saving behavior in our benchmark economy we now ask how
much of savings is precautionary savings due to uncertainty about health expenses and survival.
First, to evaluate the role of health expense risk, in a partial equilibrium, we shut down uncertainty
about all health expenses by making each retired individual face a deterministic health expense
proﬁle regardless of their nursing home status. The expense proﬁle is set to the average proﬁle before
Medicaid subsidies in the benchmark economy. Note that uncertainty about health expenses due to
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Data Benchmark No OOP No OOP
No Safety Nets No Safety Nets
Wealth†
Gini 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.57 0.64
Shares of Total, %
First Quintile -0.3 0 0 0.7 0.7
Second Quintile 1.3 0 0 5.0 4.5
Third Quintile 5.0 1.0 0.5 12.8 10.4
Fourth Quintile 12.2 12.9 10.5 25.6 19.0
Fifth Quintile 81.7 86.0 89.0 55.8 65.5
Top 10% 69.1 66.8 72.4 37.5 50.0
Top 5% 57.8 51.7 59.0 26.7 39.1
Top 1% 34.7 28.0 33.9 13.4 21.9
† Data source: Rodriguez et al. (2002).
random survival still remains. Consistently with De Nardi et al. (2006) and Hubbard et al. (1994),
we ﬁnd that, on aggregate, health expense risk plays a modest role: precautionary savings account
for 4 percent of the total capital stock (Table 11). However, the importance of health expense risk
varies over the permanent earnings distribution. In particular, it plays a more prominent role for
the fourth and ﬁfth permanent earnings quintiles, accounting for 8 and 5 percent of their wealth,
respectively. The aggregate eﬀect is smaller because individuals in the lower quintiles accumulate
more wealth with deterministic health expenses as they are less likely to qualify for Medicaid
subsidies in the absence of large shocks.
Notice, however, that although all quintiles face higher OOP health expenses due to a lower
Medicaid subsidy (for which they qualify with certainty after some age), their OOP nursing home
expenses drop. To disentangle the contribution of nursing home expense risk from that of medical
expense risk, we consider an economy where every retired individual faces certain medical expenses
but their nursing home expense risk is the same as in the benchmark. We ﬁnd that uncertainty
about medical expenses alone accounts for only 1 percent of aggregate capital accumulation, driven
by the savings of the top two quintiles (second column in Table 11). We conclude that uncertainty
about nursing home expenses is a more important motive for precautionary savings than uncertainty
about medical expenses. The intuition behind this novel result is simple: the nursing home shock
is the most persistent shock, one of the largest health cost realizations in the model economy, and
33the least insured by the government. These three features make nursing home expenses more risky
than medical expenses.
To assess the contribution of precautionary savings due to survival risk, we consider certain
lifetimes conditional on nursing home status. That is, since nursing home entry is random, and it
lowers the entrant’s life expectancy, survival risk due to nursing home entry still remains. We set
the lifetime horizon of an individual who never enters a nursing home equal to the life-expectancy
of the same individual in the benchmark economy. Individuals who enter nursing homes live to an
age given by the life expectancy conditional on entering a nursing home at age 65 in the benchmark
economy. Entering a nursing home after that age is equivalent to an immediate death.
We ﬁnd that survival risk plays a much more prominent role in savings than does health expense
risk. Precautionary savings due to survival risk accounts for 15 percent of the capital stock in the
benchmark economy (third column in Table 11). Why is survival risk so important for savings given
that social security already partially insures individuals against this type of risk? This happens
for two reasons. First, social security income is insuﬃcient for consumption smoothing of richer
individuals, and second, the presence of health expenses and their growth with age make surviving
increase lifetime health expense risk. Means-testing of Medicaid makes this risk more important for
wealthier individuals. As Table 11 shows, deterministic survival leads to a decrease in the wealth of
the top three permanent earnings quintiles. Notice, however, that part of the fall in these quintiles’
wealth is due to a decline in their OOP health expenses. This decline occurs because no one lives
to ages beyond life expectancy – when health expenses are, on average, the highest.
How much do health expenses matter for the importance of survival risk? To this end, we
repeat the above experiment in an economy identical to the benchmark except with all health
expenses removed. The change in the aggregate wealth is reported in the last column in Table
11. Without health expenses, precautionary savings due to survival risk only account for 5 percent
of the aggregate capital stock. Moreover, precautionary savings are only accumulated by the top
permanent earnings quintile; the rest of the population gets enough insurance from the social
security system. We thus conclude that, although health expense risk conditional on survival
generates little precautionary savings, the presence of health expenses substantially ampliﬁes the
role of survival risk in individual wealth accumulation. This is another novel result in the literature.
To sum up, we have shown that the benchmark economy has the following features:
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Health Expenses Deterministic Det. except NH Random None
Survival Random Random Deterministic Deterministic
relative to benchmark
relative to random survival
and no health expenses
Agg. Capital 0.961 0.989 0.847 0.948
Wealth of PE quintiles
First Quintile 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.06
Second Quintile 1.16 1.07 1.00 1.07
Third Quintile 1.04 1.00 0.89 1.02
Fourth Quintile 0.92 0.97 0.81 0.99
Fifth Quintile 0.95 0.99 0.88 0.95
OOP expenses of PE quintiles
First Quintile 1.24 1.20 0.99
Second Quintile 1.33 1.19 1.03
Third Quintile 1.21 1.06 0.98
Fourth Quintile 1.04 1.01 0.89
Fifth Quintile 1.01 1.00 0.88
Nursing home OOP expenses of PE quintiles
First Quintile 0.95 1.03 0.42
Second Quintile 0.77 1.09 0.49
Third Quintile 0.53 1.06 0.46
Fourth Quintile 0.34 1.02 0.38
Fifth Quintile 0.31 1.00 0.36
351. OOP health expenses increase with permanent earnings due to means-tested social insurance.
2. Relative to income, OOP health expense risk is highest for middle-income agents.
3. Wealth inequality is driven by the presence of social safety nets.
4. Uncertainty about health expenses plays a modest role in aggregate wealth accumulation.
5. Uncertainty about nursing home expenses is more important than uncertainty about medical
expenses.
6. Precautionary savings for survival risk is a signiﬁcant component of aggregate savings due
to the presence of health expenses that increase with age.
Noting these features of the benchmark economy will aid in our analysis of the impact of health
expenses and the structure of the old-age social insurance system on savings and inequality, which
is the main goal of this paper and the focus of the next section.
6 The Role of Health Expenses and Social Insurance
Relative to most developed countries, the U.S. social insurance system is unique in its lack of
public health care. Instead, the elderly rely on means-tested Medicaid to avoid destitution due
to high OOP health expenses. In this section, we assess the implications of the lack of public
health care for aggregate capital accumulation and inequality in wealth and consumption. To this
end, we introduce public health care such that medical and/or nursing home expenses are fully
covered by the government. We then examine the interaction of public health care with other
social insurance programs: welfare for workers, Medicaid and old-age welfare, and social security.
All the experiments considered below are revenue-neutral in a sense that government consumption
remains ﬁxed at the benchmark level. As these experiments are not actual policy reforms, we focus
on steady states and do not consider transition dynamics induced by changes in the social insurance
system.
Before proceeding to the experiments, we would like to clarify our terminology. It is important
to remember that Medicaid transfers to nursing home residents combine consumption and medical
expense subsidies, up to cn+Mn in the benchmark economy. When we refer to the public coverage
of nursing home expenses, or equivalently, elimination of nursing home expenses, we mean only
the medical expense portion, Mn, of the nursing home cost. Unlike under Medicaid, this subsidy
36is provided to all nursing home residents, and it does not restrict their consumption to cn. Con-
sumption transfers to nursing home residents are subject to means-testing in all economies that we
consider below, including those with public coverage of nursing home care.
6.1 Public Health Care
To analyze the impact that limited public coverage of both medical and nursing home expenses
together and in isolation has, we consider three public health care experiments: (1) government
covers all medical expenses but does not cover nursing home expenses, (2) government covers
nursing home expenses only, (3) government covers all health expenses. In the ﬁrst experiment,
social insurance for nursing home residents is unchanged, while the medical expenses of the rest
of the population are paid by the government. In the second experiment, the government pays
for the medical expenses of all nursing home residents regardless of their income, while the social
insurance coverage of all other health expenses is as in the benchmark economy. Finally, in the
third experiment both medical and nursing home expenses are paid for by the government. In
all the economies consumption transfers are subject to the same means tests as in the benchmark
economy. Aggregate and distributional eﬀects of each experiment are reported in Table 12.
6.1.1 Aggregate Eﬀects
Public health care greatly reduces saving incentives. Our model predicts that the aggregate capital
stock is 12 percent lower in the economy when health care is fully public (experiment 3). To show
the importance of the general equilibrium analysis, we repeat the same experiment in a partial
equilibrium. We ﬁnd that changes in after-tax prices – speciﬁcally an increase in the after-tax
interest rate – oﬀset the decline in the capital stock by 7 percentage points.
To understand which health expenses   medical or nursing home   drive the impact of public
health care on capital accumulation, we compare the eﬀects of experiments 1 and 2, which make
publicly-provided one type of care at a time. We ﬁnd that in a general equilibrium, on aggregate,
both types of expenses contribute equally: public coverage of either non-nursing home expenses only
or nursing home expenses only reduces the capital stock by 7.5 percent relative to the benchmark.
In a partial equilibrium, public coverage of nursing home expenses has a larger eﬀect than that of
medical expenses, reducing the capital stock by 10 percent compared to 7.6 percent for medical
37expenses. The relative importance of the lack of public coverage of nursing home care for capital
accumulation may seem surprising given that OOP nursing home expenses share of total OOP
health expenses is only 20 percent (see Table 8). However, this occurs for two reasons. First, as we
have shown in Section 5.2, because nursing home expenses are riskier than medical expenses, they
play a larger role in precautionary savings. Second, as discussed below, nursing home expenses
have a bigger impact on the savings of the top two permanent earnings quintiles. As Table 12
shows, in absolute terms, the asset holdings of these two quintiles decline the most across all three
experiments, accounting for the majority of the drop in the aggregate capital stock.
6.1.2 Distributional Eﬀects
To examine the eﬀects of public health care on wealth inequality, we compute percentage changes
in each permanent earnings quintile’s wealth relative to the benchmark. We ﬁnd that, when all
expenses are covered by the government, asset holdings of agents in the middle of the permanent
earnings distribution – quintiles two to four – respond the most. As Table 12 indicates, these
quintiles reduce their wealth by 20 percent whereas the wealth of the ﬁrst quintile is unaﬀected
and the top quintile reduces its wealth by only 8 percent. Moreover, comparing the changes in the
wealth holdings of each quintile relative to the benchmark under experiments 1 and 2 reveals that
nursing home expenses have a bigger impact than medical expenses on the saving behavior of the
top two permanent earnings quintiles, and the reverse is true for the second and third quintiles.
These diﬀerences in saving responses to the introduction of public health care are consistent with
the ﬁndings and intuition in the previous section: that is, because of the nature of nursing home
expenses and the structure of the social insurance system, diﬀerent earnings quintiles save for
diﬀerent kinds of OOP expenses, and hence respond the most to the elimination of their particular
expenses. Furthermore, between the two quintiles most exposed to the nursing home expense risk,
the fourth quintile reduces its wealth by a higher fraction than does the ﬁfth quintile. This occurs
because, relative to their lifetime earnings, the fourth quintile’s OOP nursing home expenses are
larger.
Figure 4 plots the wealth proﬁles of the fourth quintile under alternative public health care
experiments. Notice that public health care discourages individual savings well before retirement.
Although before retirement savings respond similarly to public coverage of medical or nursing home
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Experiment Benchmark 1 2 3
Medical Expenses OOP Public OOP Public
Nursing Home Expenses OOP OOP Public Public
Aggregates
relative to benchmark
Agg. Output 1.00 0.977 0.977 0.962
Agg. Consumption 1.00 0.992 1.004 1.023
Agg. Capital 1.00 0.925 0.925 0.878
Capital, Partial Equil. 0.924 0.902 0.810
change in wealth of PE quintiles, % of agg. capital change
All 100 100 100
First Quintile 0.7 -0.1 0.0
Second Quintile 13.2 -0.3 6.0
Third Quintile 21.7 7.6 15.3
Fourth Quintile 26.8 37.9 35.0
Fifth Quintile 36.0 49.6 39.6
wealth of PE quintiles relative to benchmark
First Quintile 1.00 0.87 1.02 1.00
Second Quintile 1.00 0.72 1.01 0.80
Third Quintile 1.00 0.82 0.94 0.80
Fourth Quintile 1.00 0.91 0.87 0.80
Fifth Quintile 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.92
Income Tax Rate 0.254 0.271 0.259 0.257
% of 65+ w/Transfers 23 18 21 16
Health Expenses relative to benchmark
OOP 1.00 0.27 0.77 0.04†
Std(OOP) 1.00 0.74 0.73 0.10
Inequality
Consumption Gini 0.417 0.424 0.426 0.434
Wealth Gini 0.829 0.840 0.832 0.842
shares of total wealth, %
Fourth Quintile 12.9 11.5 13.1 11.9
Fifth Quintile 86.1 87.7 85.8 87.2
Top 10% 66.8 68.9 67.9 69.8
Top 5% 51.7 54.0 53.8 56.0
Top 1% 28.0 30.0 30.0 31.7
† OOP expenses are positive because, to make our measure of nursing home expenses more consistent with the
measure used in the data, we include a consumption component that is not covered in experiments 1-3.
39expenses, the rate of dissaving up to age 85 is substantially lower when the only OOP expenses
are the ones for nursing homes. We conclude that it is the nursing home and not medical expenses
that slow down wealth depletion after retirement.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the introduction of public health care – public coverage of nursing home
expenses in particular – dramatically increases inequality among retired individuals (Figure 5a),
in spite of having only a small positive eﬀect on overall cross-sectional inequality. At the end
of the life cycle, the wealth Gini coeﬃcient (within cohort) increases by as much as 20 points.
Higher inequality without OOP health expenses would appear rather surprising had we not already
discussed the diﬀerential response of savings to the public coverage of health expenses across the
permanent earnings quintiles. As the top quintile experiences a smaller drop in its wealth relative
to the second, third, and fourth quintiles, its share of aggregate wealth is bound to rise. Notice that
the presence of OOP medical expenses is the main driver of reduced within-cohort wealth inequality
among individuals under age 83 when going from full public health care to the benchmark, while
OOP nursing home expenses account for this reduction for the older generations. This is explained
by the fact that nursing home risk grows substantially with age: under the benchmark calibration,
the probability of entering a nursing home after age 85 is more than triple the probability for ages
75 to 84. Moreover, while we ﬁnd that public health care slightly increases consumption inequality,
it substantially reduces consumption inequality among those 85 years and older (Figure 5b). These
are the people most likely to enter a nursing home and it is the coverage of nursing home expenses
that drives the fall in their consumption inequality.
The above experiments have shown that
1. Lack of public health care greatly stimulates capital accumulation;
2. OOP nursing home expenses account for half of the aggregate eﬀect;
3. Nursing home expenses are a larger component of the savings of the rich than medical
expenses and the reverse is true for the poor;
4. The savings response to public health care diﬀers dramatically across the permanent earnings
distribution;
5. While having a small eﬀect on aggregate inequality, public health care signiﬁcantly increases
within-cohort wealth inequality and reduces within-cohort consumption inequality among
the very old (ages above life expectancy).
406.2 Health Care Interaction With Other Social Insurance Programs
To what extent are these results driven by the presence of other social insurance programs? We ask
this question for the following reasons. First, recall that Medicaid provides a diﬀerential insurance
against medical versus nursing home expenses. Second, means-testing implies that rich and poor
face diﬀerent types of OOP health expenses. Third, in Section 5.1, we found that wealth inequality
is driven by the presence of the safety nets (welfare and Medicaid). Fourth, both Medicaid and
pay-as-you-go social insurance partially insure the elderly against survival and health expense risk.
To understand the interactions between these social insurance programs and their implications for
the eﬀects of public health care, we modify/eliminate one feature of the social insurance system at
a time and then compare the eﬀects of public health care in the alternative economies to those in
the benchmark.
6.2.1 Medicaid Insurance of Nursing Home Expenses
To understand why nursing home expenses play such an important role in capital accumulation, we
modify the Medicaid means-testing so that it does not discriminate between health expenses, i.e.
it guarantees the same consumption ﬂoor to nursing home residents as the rest of the population
receives in the benchmark economy: cn = cm. We term this ‘quality’ nursing home care. We
repeat experiments (1) through (3) in the economy with quality nursing home care. The results
are presented in Table 13.
Quality public nursing home care reduces ‘Medicaid aversion’, i.e. incentives to avoid public care.
Precautionary savings fall and the capital stock declines by 4 percent relative to the benchmark
economy. Next, we introduce public health care into the economy with quality nursing home care.
Elimination of OOP health expenses in this economy reduces the capital stock by 9 percent, which is
3 percentage points less than the eﬀect of public health care in the benchmark economy. Moreover,
quality pubic nursing home care reduces the importance of nursing home expenses relative to
medical expenses for aggregate savings. In the benchmark economy, half of the additional savings
accumulated without public health care was due to the presence of OOP nursing home expenses,
with quality nursing home care this fraction is reduced to one third. That is, a higher level of
public insurance for nursing home expenses makes this type of destitution less painful, reducing
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Experiment Benchmark Quality NH 1(Q) 2(Q) 3(Q)
Medical Expenses OOP OOP Public OOP Public
Nursing Home Expenses OOP (Q)OOP (Q)OOP (Q)Public (Q)Public
Aggregates
Relative to Benchmark
Agg. Output 1.00 0.988 0.965 0.977 0.962
Agg. Capital 1.00 0.962 0.887 0.925 0.877
Relative to Quality NH
Agg. Capital 1.00 0.922 0.961 0.912
Income Tax Rate 0.254 0.259 0.277 0.260 0.257
% of 65+ w/Transfers 23 23 19 21 16
Health Expenses relative to benchmark
OOP 1.00 0.99 0.26 0.80 0.07
Std(OOP) 1.00 0.99 0.73 0.74 0.16
the desire to avoid it with self-insurance. Note that nursing home expenses still play a large role
in aggregate savings relative to their size – they are only one ﬁfth of total health expenses. This is
because even with quality nursing home care, nursing home expenses are risky relative to medical
expenses due to their size and persistence. The relative impacts of health expenses on savings
are also illustrated in Figure 6 which shows the wealth proﬁles of the fourth permanent earnings
quintile in diﬀerent experiments. Comparing with Figure 4, with quality nursing homes, the wealth
proﬁle under publicly-funded nursing home care lies signiﬁcantly closer to the proﬁle without the
coverage. We conclude that diﬀerential insurance for nursing home care versus medical care has a
signiﬁcant impact on wealth accumulation.
6.2.2 Safety Nets
We now examine the interaction of safety nets with the eﬀects of public health care. In our model
economy, the welfare program for workers and Medicaid/welfare for retirees partially insure against
earnings, survival, and health expense risks by providing means-tested transfers that guarantee
a minimum consumption level. As means-tested welfare transfers eﬀectively tax away low-level
savings, they discourage savings disproportionably more for the poor, reducing aggregate capital
accumulation and increasing wealth inequality (the latter shown in Section 5.1). To start, we assess
42the role of safety nets for workers, for retirees, and for both by removing (almost completely) each
type of welfare (experiments 4   6). This is achieved by setting consumption ﬂoors for workers
and/or retirees to a very small value, while leaving all other features of the benchmark economy
unchanged. Then, to evaluate the contribution of safety nets to the eﬀects of public health care, we
introduce public health care into the economy without safety nets (experiment 7). The aggregate
and distributional eﬀects of experiments 4 through 7 are presented in Table 14.
In all the economies we consider here, agents are still partially insured through the progressive
social security program against all three types of risk. Apart from this insurance, experiment 4
maximizes individual exposure to earnings risk by removing the welfare program for workers, exper-
iment 5 maximizes individual exposure to health expense and survival risk by removing Medicaid
and the old-age welfare program, and experiment 6 maximizes individual exposure to all three types
of risks by removing all the welfare and Medicaid programs. Extra risk and higher expected OOP
health expenses create strong incentives to save across all income levels. In the economy with the
least amount of insurance (experiment 6), the capital stock increases by 134 percent. The removal
of which safety nets – those for workers or the elderly – is responsible for the large increase in
aggregate savings under experiment 6? Experiments 4 and 5 provide the answer: while removing
the welfare program for workers (experiment 4) increases the capital stock by 36 percent, remov-
ing the welfare program for the elderly (experiment 5) increases the capital stock by 126 percent.
Hence, increasing agents’ exposure to health expense risk substantially increases savings relative to
increasing their exposure to earnings risk.
Why is increased exposure to health expense risk a more important driver of precautionary sav-
ings than that for earnings risk? The answer lies in the timing of the two types of shocks. Individuals
accumulate savings during the working stages of live in order ﬁnance health expenses experienced
after retirement. These savings provide a nearly suﬃcient buﬀer against earnings shocks before
retirement. That is, consumption smoothing over the working stage of life in response to increased
earnings risk requires relatively little extra savings given the presence of OOP health expenses.
This would not have been the case were the two types of shocks experienced simultaneously.
Given the large insurance role of safety nets, it is not surprising that the introduction of public
health care into economy 6 substantially cuts down aggregate savings (by nearly a half, see experi-
ment 7) and increases wealth Gini by 9 percentage points. We conclude that the presence of safety
43Table 14: Interaction of Health Care with Safety Nets and Social Security
Experiments Benchmark 4 5 6 7 8 9
Public Health Care No No No No Yes No Yes
Safety Nets In Place All Retirees Workers None None All All
Social Security Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Aggregates relative to benchmark
Agg. Output 1.00 1.097 1.278 1.290 1.064 1.099 1.096
Agg. Consumption 1.00 1.018 0.947 0.936 1.053 1.018 1.055
Agg. Capital 1.00 1.360 2.264 2.339 1.231 1.368 1.357
Agg. Capital relative to no public health care: 0.526 0.992
Wealth of PE quintiles relative to benchmark
First Quintile 1.00 10.96 25.86 28.90 13.40 1.31 1.57
Second Quintile 1.00 3.48 9.01 9.39 3.43 1.37 1.61
Third Quintile 1.00 2.01 4.57 4.74 1.82 1.50 1.59
Fourth Quintile 1.00 1.38 2.40 2.48 1.15 1.54 1.50
Fifth Quintile 1.00 1.09 1.35 1.38 0.99 1.30 1.26
Social Insurance
Income Tax Rate 0.254 0.224 0.187 0.176 0.223 0.235 0.219
Transfers, % Output 2.8 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.0 3.4 2.3
% of 65+ w/Transfers 23 21 6 7 3 39 32
% of NH resid. w/Transfers 60 61 19 19 3 72 44
Health Expenses relative to benchmark
OOP 1.00 1.02 1.25 1.25 0 0.72 0
Std(OOP) 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 0 0.9 0
Inequality
Consumption Gini 0.417 0.485 0.487 0.526 0.487 0.382 0.388
Wealth Gini 0.829 0.665 0.569 0.553 0.642 0.814 0.805
shares of total wealth, %
Fourth Quintile 12.9 18.9 26.1 25.9 18.9 13.9 15.1
Fifth Quintile 86.1 66.7 55.5 54.4 65.1 85.0 83.4
Top 1% 28.0 20.7 12.8 12.4 22.5 22.2 22.3
44nets for the elderly weakens the eﬀects of public health care on wealth accumulation and inequality.
6.2.3 Social Security
The last part of the social insurance system we examine is the pay-as-you-go Social Security pro-
gram. Removing Social Security in experiment 8 causes a large (37 percent) increase in savings
for retirement and OOP health expenses. In contrast to all other economies considered above, the
introduction of public health care in such an economy has little eﬀect on aggregate wealth accumu-
lation and inequality. Aggregate savings are nearly unaﬀected because savings of the bottom three
permanent earnings quintiles actually increase in response to public health care, counteracting the
decline in savings of the top two quintiles. In the economy without Social Security or public health
care (experiment 8), all individuals save for retirement, but only the wealthy also save for health
expenses. In fact, 39 percent of retirees receive means-tested transfers, so at least 39 percent of
individuals face a negative marginal return on savings. Introducing public health care lifts the
poor oﬀ the safety nets enough that they face a positive return on savings. In turn, the higher tax
base and lower transfer payments allow the government to ﬁnance public health care with a lower
income tax rate, further encouraging savings.
6.3 Discussion
To sum up, we ﬁnd that there are important interactions between public health care and other
features of a social insurance system. The results of experiments in Table 14 shed some light
on how variations in social insurance systems – means-testing in particular – matter not only for
aggregate savings and consumption but also for wealth and consumption inequality. For example,
while an economy with public health care and means-tested transfers features a high degree of
wealth inequality (experiment 3), same economy without means-tested transfers has signiﬁcantly
less wealth inequality and a substantially higher capital stock and consumption (experiment 7).
While our primary goal is to understand the implications of the lack of public health care for
the elderly in the U.S., these results suggest that our framework is useful for thinking about cross-
country diﬀerences in social insurance systems and their implications for savings and economic
inequality. While social insurance systems in countries like the U.S., UK, Australia, and New
Zealand target the poor through extensive means-testing, countries of continental Europe feature
45generous universal family beneﬁts with little use of safety nets. Furthermore, despite the fact
that most developed countries have public health care, there are large diﬀerences across countries
in public coverage of nursing home care costs and its means-testing. The number of countries
providing universal nursing home care coverage has been growing and include Austria, Germany,
Japan, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. However, nursing home care in France, Israel, and New
Zealand is still provided through means-tested social insurance.
Moreover, countries diﬀer in their total expenditure on nursing home care as well as in the
fraction of these expenditures which are made OOP. Among the OECD countries, in 2000, expen-
diture on nursing home care varied from 0.3 percent of GDP in France to 2.3 percent of GDP in
the Netherlands. Even within the group of countries with a universal long-term care system (no
means-testing for either home or institutional care), there is a substantial variation in the private
costs due to diﬀerent beneﬁciary cost-sharing requirements.13 Our analysis suggests that these
diﬀerences should manifest themselves in countries’ savings and economic inequality, giving a nice
ground for a formal policy analysis. Financing the growing costs of nursing home care, and long-
term care in general, has become a key concern for policymakers as well as individuals in ageing
societies around the world. According to the OECD report on long-term care by Fujisawa and
Colombo (2009), in the past decade, real per capita long-term nursing care spending has increased
by an average of 6.5 percent per year across 24 OECD countries. In 16 OECD countries, per capita
private expenses on long-term nursing care have on average tripled between 2000 and 2006.
7 Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that lack of public health care for the elderly plays a big role in wealth
accumulation but that the aggregate and distributional eﬀects depend on the availability of other
programs comprising the social insurance system, such as social safety nets for young and old and
pay-as-you-go social security. Here we would like to reemphasize a couple of novel results. First, we
found that social insurance of nursing home care plays a special role in wealth accumulation. The
lack of public coverage of nursing home care costs greatly stimulates wealth accumulation by richer
individuals and promotes consumption inequality among the elderly. This eﬀect is in part due to
13These expenses may include food, housing, and other copayments; these may be related to income.
46the lower level of insurance provided by Medicaid for nursing home care relative to that for medical
care. Second, we found that the relationships between the extent and type of social insurance and
various economic indicators are complex and highly dependent on the eligibility criteria – universal
versus means-tested – to receive social assistance from a particular government program.
In order to make our results transparent, we simpliﬁed our analysis by abstracting from endo-
geneity of labor supply, diﬀerential mortality, utility derived from health and care, the household’s
life-cycle, caregiving and other transfers within the family. Abstraction from labor supply decisions
means we have not taken into account distortions caused by the labor income tax and social safety
nets as well as self-insurance through an intertemporal substitution in labor in response to earnings
shocks. Since in the data life expectancy is higher for high-income individuals, the lifetime health
expense risk faced by these individuals is also higher, which may enhance the diﬀerential eﬀects of
social insurance policies we found in our study. Our calibration strategy exploits the assumption
that the positive relationship observed between individual permanent income and OOP health ex-
penses (De Nardi et al. (2006)) is completely accounted for by the presence of safety nets. That
is, richer individuals face higher OOP expenses due to the means-testing of Medicaid transfers.
However, it would be interesting to relax this assumption by incorporating a choice of health care
quality and study how this margin responds to policy changes. We also assumed that health shocks
carry no disutility. While the evidence is mixed, lower marginal utility of consumption at older
ages, especially for nursing home residents, would imply that individuals put a smaller weight on
bad health states and hence require smaller savings for old age.
Extending the model by incorporating the household life-cycle – marriage, divorce, spousal
death, and children – would allow additional and potentially important dimensions to be considered.
For example the importance of diﬀerential health expense risk and mortality for men and women
and for married individuals versus singles could be assessed. Marriages may be important because
nursing home risk potentially diﬀers by martial status, in part, because risk-sharing is available
within a household.14 Since a large fraction of lifetime health expenses are experienced in the last
year of life, often impoverishing the surviving spouse, the risk of spousal death and the extent to
which survivor beneﬁts provided by the social insurance system insure this risk may be important for
14Heterogeneity in health and demand for nursing care open yet another avenue for modeling bargaining within
the household.
47individual savings decisions. A household approach would also allow one to endogenize caregiving
decisions within the family and nursing home entry. In the data, institutional care satisﬁes only
a small part of long-term care needs. The majority of the elderly with needs receive their care
informally from family members – mostly spouses and children – while some obtain formal in-home
nursing care. Moreover, an intergenerational set-up would allow one to examine the exchange of
wealth and care time between parents and children. As government programs in many countries
use subsidies to encourage home care – a less costly alternative to institutional care, it would be
interesting to examine the caregiver’s labor supply response to such policies. We leave these issues
for future research.
Appendix
A.1 Probability Transition Matrix
Formally, the probability of an age-j agent going from current state x to future state x′ is given by
Qj(x,x′)  I
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The steps in computing the model equilibrium are as follows. First guesses on aggregate capital
and the income tax rate are made. Note that the social security tax rate can be computed ex ante.
Second, individual maximization problems are solved. Agents’ problems in the last period of their
48lives are solved ﬁrst, followed by the previous period, up to the ﬁrst period. Individual decision
rules are computed using piecewise linear interpolation. The grids for assets and average lifetime
earnings consist of 200 and 100 nonlinearly-spaced points, respectively. Third, the distribution
of the population over the discrete state is computed using forward iteration. Finally, updated
aggregates are computed. This procedure is iterated on until the capital stock converges and the
government budget constraint holds.
A.3 Earnings Process
The stochastic component of the earnings process consists of a ﬁve-state discrete Markov chain. The
chain is characterized by a ﬁve element grid of possible realizations, an initial distribution over that
grid, Γz, and a 25 element probability transition matrix, Λzz′. The grid, which is set such that ex-
pected average annual earnings in the model is normalized to one, is [ 6.4823,0.0155,0.8747,1.2000,3.2102].
The initial distribution, probability transition matrix and grid are chosen by minimizing the dif-
ference between the model’s prediction and the data on the 24 statistics mentioned in Section
4.3. The minimization results are provided in Table 15. The initial distribution generated by the









0.9684 0.0267 0.0049 0.0000 0
0.0424 0.9305 0.0271 0.0000 0
0.0079 0.0229 0.9682 0.0010 0.0000
0 0.0052 0.0635 0.9300 0.0013










A.4 Medical Expense Process
The stochastic component of the medical expense process is governed by a four-point discrete
Markov chain. Its grid of realizations is [ 5.83, 3.00, 1.70,0.685], the initial distribution of
non-nursing home entrants across medical expenses, Γh, is [0.2205,0.2177,0.5209,0.0409], and the
49Table 15: Targets for Earnings Process: Data and Model
Targeted Moments Data Model
Earnings
First-order autocorrelation 0.97 0.97
Variance log earnings, ratio age 55 to age 35 1.89 1.33
Gini 0.61 0.56
Shares of Total, %
First Quintile -0.2 0.3
Second Quintile 4.0 7.4
Third Quintile 13.0 13.4
Fourth Quintile 22.9 22.1
Fifth Quintile 60.2 57.8
Top 10% 42.9 40.2
Top 5% 31.1 31.4
Top 1% 15.3 15.9
Social Security Income
Shares and Means, % shares mean†
First Quintile 5.7 3.9 8 7
Second Quintile 15.4 14.5 21 25
Third Quintile 20.4 20.7 28 35
Fourth Quintile 24.5 28.2 34 49
Fifth Quintile 34.0 33.3 47 58
Top 10% 8.3 17.8
Top 5% 8.2 9.5
Top 1% 3.1 2.0
† normalized by p.c. income








0.6510 0.2290 0.1100 0.0100
0.1512 0.7427 0.0961 0.0099
0.0423 0.1668 0.7809 0.0105
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(a) Fraction on Medicaid






































(b) Fraction of Nursing Home Residents on Medicaid
Figure 1: Life Cycle Proﬁles In the Benchmark Economy: Medicaid









































(a) Average OOP Health Expenses







































(b) Relative to Average Current Income
Figure 2: OOP Health Expenses by PE Quintiles in the Benchmark Economy

































































Figure 3: Life Cycle Proﬁles In the Benchmark Economy: Inequality























Figure 4: Wealth Proﬁles of Fourth Quintile in Various Public Health Care Experiments



















































































Figure 5: Public Health Care Experiments: Inequality Eﬀects
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 Q Pub NH
 Q Pub All
Figure 6: Wealth Proﬁles of Fourth Quintile with Quality Nursing Home Care and in Various Public
Health Care Experiments
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